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Gateway to Invasion or the Curse of 
Geography? The Canadian Arctic and 
the Question of Security, 1939-1999
Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn
What is important to Canadians is not what we think the 
Russians will do; it is what we think the Americans think the 
Russians will do.1
The Arctic has a very special hold on the Canadian psyche despite the fact that very few Canadians have actually ever seen the North. Strategist Kenneth Eyre observed that the “North to Canadians is 
more of an idea than a place.”2 Nevertheless, it was not until the Second 
World War that Canadian apathy towards its Arctic was actually broken. 
The war led to a continental alliance which dictated the close cooperation 
between Canada and the United States in the defence of North America. It 
was also the catalyst that sparked a new surge of interest in the North. 
 The looming Japanese threat to Alaska and the fear of a Nazi occupied 
Siberia, only a short distance away across the Bering Strait, raised American 
anxiety in regard to its security to an unprecedented high. The subsequent 
American mobilization to meet the perceived peril quickly spilled into 
Canada and transformed its North into a hive of activity. Unfortunately, the 
Americans placed little weight on the formalities of ownership and executed 
their tasks with a single-mindedness that raised the concern that the long 
neglected Canadian North was actually under the control of the United 
States. 
 The growing American presence, coupled with their dominating atti-
tude, worried Canadian politicians. This fear soon led to action to safeguard 
Canadian sovereignty. Canada had always been defensive of its claim to 
ownership of the Arctic archipelago and the growing occupation of the 
North, by the United States, was seen as a direct threat to Canadian propri-
etorship. The American presence, argued Canadian governmental officials, 
could be seen as de facto control. As a result, a policy was implemented to 
reimburse the Americans for their wartime developments in the North, re-
gardless of whether the Canadian government had originally supported or 
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wanted the subject projects. It was not lost on the politicians that sovereignty 
has a price. Equally clear were the consequences of not paying that price.
 Canada’s new wartime defence partnership underscored another in-
escapable reality. It became evident that any threat to the security of the 
United States perceived by the Americans, whether realistic or not, repre-
sented a genuine danger to Canada. The national political and military 
leadership promptly realized that it was critical that Canada be seen by its 
southern neighbour to be taking adequate steps to secure Canadian borders 
from any intrusion that could subsequently threaten the United States. This 
geographical reality was exacerbated at the end of the Second World War. 
New technology, weapons of immense potency and the emergence of two 
diametrically opposed superpowers – with Canada sandwiched between 
them – fuelled what would become a continuing challenge to Canada’s ef-
forts to maintain the security and sovereignty of its Arctic regions. 
 It is this balance between security and sovereignty that begs examina-
tion. Was Canada’s defence policy and northern focus oriented toward a real 
menace in the Arctic as a result of a belief that its security was jeopardized by 
the threat of invasion by belligerent powers? Or, was it geared to thwarting 
the perceived peril to its sovereignty by an ally? Careful scrutiny uncovers a 
Canadian defence policy that was focused more on frustrating erosion to its 
sovereignty and minimizing American expansion into the Canadian Arctic, 
than it was on meeting any real danger to its territory from hostile invasion. 
Although a degree of potential threat was always recognized, more so by 
the military than the political leadership, decisions taken on defence of the 
North were primarily geared to countering American encroachment. This 
theme, which was initiated by Prime Minister King in the Second World War, 
continues to the present.
 Before 1939, Canadian politicians, as well as their military commanders, 
placed very little emphasis on the Arctic. The primary stimulus of the limited 
northern development conducted by the government during this period was 
the result of a select few individuals. Patrons such as J.A. Wilson, the Controller 
of Civil Aviation, and Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, the Chief of the 
General Staff (CGS), sponsored initiatives that included the survey of suit-
able landing fields in the Arctic archipelago; a program of aerial photography 
for mapping purposes; and the establishment of a series of northern radio 
stations.3 Not surprisingly, the vast majority of growth in the North was 
primarily civilian in nature. Canadian Airways and Mackenzie Air Service, 
two commercial airlines that commenced operations in the Arctic in the late 
1920s were instrumental in opening up the North.4 Nonetheless, eventually, 
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a series of civilian airfields and emergency landing strips, supported by the 
Departments of Defence and Transport, were established across the entire 
Dominion. These fields were primarily used by Trans-Canada Airlines but 
also yielded a network that could be used to concentrate military air strength 
in time of crisis.5 
 Much of this development was due to depression-era relief projects. 
However, continuing interest in an air route to Alaska and Europe over 
the Arctic was always prevalent and by 1935, technological and economic 
conditions merited a closer examination of its viability.6 Consequently, the 
government-sponsored survey of northern airfields was conducted to deter-
mine whether expansion of existing sites was required and what additional 
landing fields were necessary.7 Construction on this network of airfields was 
undertaken in 1939 and continued well into the war. It eventually became 
known as the Northwest Staging Route and it proved instrumental in the 
defence of Alaska and in the supply of aircraft and equipment to the belea-
guered Soviet Union.8 
 Despite the remarkable strides in aviation and the limited but growing 
commercial development of the North, both the military and political leader-
ship shared the belief that the Canadian Arctic represented a negligible se-
curity threat to the “fire-proof house” of Canada. In 1938, Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King asserted, “May I point out that undoubtably Canada is the 
most secure of all countries.”9 He dismissed “the launching of fantastic ex-
peditions across half the world [by belligerents intending to attack Canada]” 
and stated that “at present danger of attack upon Canada is minor in degree 
and second-hand in origin. It is against chance shots that we need immedi-
ately to defend ourselves.”10 
 The Minister of National Defence (MND), Ian Mackenzie, agreed. “There 
is danger,” he acknowledged, “but so far as Canada is concerned, it is, as I 
have already pointed out, an incidental contingency.”11 He asserted that the 
direct defence of Canada entailed the defence of “our coastal areas, our ports, 
our shipping terminals, our territorial waters, the focal areas of our trade 
routes adjacent to our harbour mouths.”12 Specifically, he felt that the threat 
consisted largely of raids by submarine, aircraft or other craft for the purpose 
of creating diversion and panic.13
 The military perception was little different. “The idea of our having 
to fight a major war on our own soil,” wrote Lieutenant-General Maurice 
Pope, “was absurd...As the forms and scales of attack to which it was judged 
Canada might be exposed in the event of even a major war comprised only 
limited naval and air bombardment and minor raids against our defended 
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ports.”14 This judgement changed little even with the commencement of hos-
tilities. An Army appreciation in February 1941 stated that “Canada’s front 
line lies in and around the British Isles.” 15 
 The apparent lack of concern of any menace to Canada’s security 
emanated from the nation’s geographic endowment. A military analysis of 
Canadian defence problems noted that “The direct defence of the national 
territory ... owing to our fortunate geographical position ... has not been 
given a high degree of priority.”16 General Charles Foulkes reinforced this 
theme. “Prior to 1939,” he explained, “Canada was able to derive a consider-
able amount of security from her geographical position. The then available 
weapons precluded a direct attack on Canada.”17 
 Geography and history provided Canada with another important ele-
ment in its defence, namely, a powerful neighbour to the south. The close 
proximity to the United States prompted Colonel E.L.M. Burns in 1936 to 
write that “we believe, reasonably or unreasonably, that our Southern neigh-
bour would go to war before she would allow a foreign nation to establish 
itself on our territory.”18 The renowned Canadian historian C.P. Stacey re-
peated this thesis in his examination of Canadian defence policy in 1940. “It 
has long been generally recognized in Canada,” he insisted, “that the most 
elementary regard for the security of the United States itself would render it 
impossible for that country to permit any aggressive power to gain a foothold 
on Canadian soil.”19 
 These conclusions were not entirely visionary. In 1936, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt raised the image of a benevolent neighbour when he 
stated: “We can defend ourselves, and we can defend our neighbourhood.”20 
Two years later he erased any doubt with his famous declaration at Queen’s 
University in Kingston. “The Dominion of Canada,” he announced, “is part 
of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people 
of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is 
threatened by any other empire. We as good neighbours are true friends.”21
 Two days later King responded. “We, too,” he declared, “have our obliga-
tions as a good friendly neighbour, and one of these is to see that, at our own 
instance our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion 
as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that should the occasion 
ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by 
land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory.”22 These cour-
ageous words were uttered at a time when there were no perceived threats 
to Canada because of its geographical location and the naval might of both 
Britain and the United States. As a result, King’s pledge to guard the flanks 
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of his neighbour seemed effortless and easily enforced. However, his words 
would return to haunt him and take on the essence of a curse. World events 
and technological developments soon changed Canada’s outlook on security 
forever, particularly with respect to its Arctic regions.
 The Second World War dramatically altered Canada’s perception of its 
security and fuelled an unprecedented concern for its North. Paradoxically, 
the emphasis on northern security became focused primarily on protecting 
national sovereignty from the perceived encroachment of an ally rather than 
guarding an unprotected flank from hostile invasion. 
 The catalyst was the renewed American focus on Alaska. Originally, 
American politicians and military leaders shared a common apathy with 
their Canadian counterparts in regard to their northern territory. “In the 
halls of Congress, Alaska was described as a ‘frozen waste,’ much as strategic 
Guam was passed off by some Representatives as a ‘grain of sand.’”23 The 
military leadership shared a similar view. An official report tabled just prior 
to the American entry into the war argued that “there appears at present to 
be no necessity, from the viewpoint of national defense, of increasing the mil-
itary garrison of Alaska.”24 Few acknowledged Brigadier-General Mitchell’s 
observation that Alaska, “as the most central place in the world of aircraft,” 
was subsequently the most strategic location on earth. He reasoned that 
“whoever holds Alaska will hold the world.”25 
 It took the Axis juggernaut to galvanize American action in the North. 
The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 “muddied the already 
seething situation in the Far East and seemed to bring closer to Alaska the 
danger that Alaskans had been advertising for years.”26 The realization that 
“in the possession of the enemy Alaska will furnish a jumping-off point for 
invasion by air of the United States” soon resulted in the restoration of money 
to expand Alaskan defence.27 The Permanent Joint Board for Defence (PJBD) 
concluded on February 26, 1942, “that the effective defence of Alaska is of 
paramount importance to the defence of the continent against attack from 
the West, since Alaska is the area most exposed to an attempt by the enemy 
to establish a foothold in North America.”28 
 Canadians quickly absorbed the idea of a northern threat via Alaska. “It 
was easy to believe,” wrote Canadian military historian Desmond Morton, 
“as Japanese power spread irresistibly across Southeast Asia ... that it could 
also reach out easily to seize a foothold in North America. If the threat was 
far-fetched militarily, it was politically all too real.”29 Even Mitch Hepburn, 
the Premier of Ontario at the time, “predicted a Japanese assault on Alaska, 
and [he] visualized the enemy infiltrating down the western coast of 
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Canada.”30 Prime Minister King also believed that the Japanese represented 
a real danger. He warned his military officials that it would be foolish to 
discount their strength. Moreover, King cautioned his generals not to rule 
out the possibility of operations of a larger or more serious nature.31 
 Despite the dire admonitions, the military was not overly alarmed. Even 
the Japanese seizure of the islands of Attu, Agatu, and Kiska in the Aleutians 
in the early summer of 1942 failed to change their outlook. Their analysis 
reaffirmed that “the forms and scales of attack envisioned on the entry of 
Japan into the war remained unchanged.”32 The confidence of the military 
commanders rested on the premise that there were no military objectives 
of sufficient importance to justify other than small hit-and-run raids, the ef-
fect of which would have little military significance. In addition, the generals 
emphasized that the Japanese were already over-committed. The Chiefs of 
Staff Committee clearly stated that an invasion of Canada’s West Coast by 
Japanese forces was considered highly remote.33
 Nonetheless, the military chain of command took into account the 
anxiety of the public. “The question of increasing protection in British 
Columbia,” asserted an Army appreciation, “is one of vocal and increasing 
concern on the part of the civilian population. In view of the immense length 
of the coast line, greater mobility of Army personnel would seem a matter of 
urgent consideration and might do much to allay the present feeling of ap-
prehension.”34 As a result, the West Coast was reinforced with artillery and 
manpower.35 Lieutenant-General Pope, however, noted the nature of the real 
threat. “It was clear that if ... Canada should attempt to remain neutral and 
aloof,” he explained, “our American neighbours would ride roughshod over 
us and make use of our territory and facilities as it pleased them.”36 
 Pope’s observation was the more accurate. The response of the United 
States to the new northern menace was representative of the energy and 
seemingly unlimited resources of a great power. The American reaction was 
swift and all encompassing. It created an intricate web that eventually entan-
gled Canada. The expeditious American mobilization resulted in a massive 
influx of personnel to reinforce the Alaskan garrison, as well as to establish 
the logistical infrastructure required to support the new defensive effort in 
the North. By June 1943, more than 33,000 American soldiers and civilian 
workers had poured into northwestern Canada.37 
 The American “invasion” was driven by their perception of defensive 
steps required to protect the North. These included the expansion and up-
grading of the Northwestern Staging Route, the construction of a land route 
to Alaska, and the assurance of petroleum for military forces in the North. 
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These projects all encompassed development on Canadian territory and 
were, theoretically, subject to consultation and agreement between the two 
nations in accordance with the Ogdensburg Agreement.38 The Ogdensburg 
Agreement was signed in haste – almost in panic – as a contingency for the 
imminent collapse of Britain. As the tide of war began to shift, the conse-
quences of the agreement soon became clear.39 Nonetheless, although the 
projects signed under the auspices of the agreement were grounded in the 
noble pursuit of mutual defence, they quickly highlighted the dangers of a 
relationship between two unequal partners. 
 What were trumpeted as “projects of vital importance” to the secur-
ity of North America very quickly captured Canadian attention. One such 
project, the construction of the Alaska Highway, was representative of the 
difficulties facing Canada. As early as 1928, both Americans and Canadians 
had thought about a land route to Alaska; however, the exorbitant cost 
and “negligible military value” precluded any official support.40 American 
military planners viewed a road link to Alaska as of little strategic import-
ance and primarily of economic benefit to civilians.41 The Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbour abruptly changed the American perspective.42 Overnight, the 
construction of an all-weather road was seen as “one of the most import-
ant steps toward making Alaska defensible.”43 Once the Americans decided 
what was necessary, they took prompt action with little regard for Canadian 
sensitivities.
  On February 12, 1942, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs 
informed the Cabinet War Committee that the Americans had concluded 
that construction of a land route to Alaska on Canadian soil was necessary 
for continental defence, but they had not yet submitted a formal request to do 
so.44 It was not until February 26, 1942, that the PJBD, as its twenty-fourth rec-
ommendation, advised that the construction of the Alaska Highway should 
be undertaken. The Canadian dilemma was evident. The government was 
reluctant to proceed with the project. Nevertheless, a secret External Affairs 
memorandum conceded that “the United States Government is now so insist-
ent that the road is required that the Canadian Government cannot possibly 
allow itself to be put in the position of barring the United States from land 
access to Alaska.”45 It commented that the Canadian government would be 
in a completely untenable position if it prevented the construction of land 
communications to Alaska and subsequently, as unlikely as it may be, the 
Japanese were able to deny the United States access by sea.46
 The alternative, however, was daunting. It required Canada “to expend 
some $80,000,000.00 on the construction, and about $1,000,000.00 per annum 
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on the maintenance of a road that would be a monument to our friendship 
for the U.S. but would otherwise be pretty much of a ‘White Elephant.’”47 
Cabinet concluded that Canada had little choice but to agree. War Cabinet 
Committee approval was subsequently given on March 5, 1942.48 
 But the Cabinet’s approval was irrelevant. The actual decision to proceed 
had already been made in the United States. President Roosevelt considered 
the matter a fait accompli. Consequently, he had allocated $10 million for 
the project from his emergency fund as early as February 11.49 As a result, 
American engineers arrived in Dawson Creek to begin construction on the 
road two days before Cabinet approved the request.50 The highway eventu-
ally proved insignificant. By the autumn of 1943, only 54 tons of supplies had 
been delivered to the Alaska Defense Command by road.51
 Nonetheless, the American presence quickly struck a chord with 
Canadians, particularly Prime Minister King. Alarming reports emanating 
from the North painted a grim picture for a country that laboured at main-
taining a decorum of autonomy and independence. One account acknow-
ledged that “the Americans in Edmonton are openly describing themselves 
as an ‘Army of Occupation.’”52 To King the spectre of American encroach-
ment was very real. “I said,” he wrote in his diary, “I was not altogether with-
out feeling that the Alaska Highway was less intended for protection against 
Japan than as one of the dangers of the hand which America is placing more 
or less over the whole of the Western Hemisphere.”53
 The Alaska Highway was not the only source of concern. The CANOL 
project provided similar hazards to the Canadian hosts. Its aim was to pro-
vide a guaranteed supply of fuel to Alaska and military traffic en route by 
means of a pipeline from Norman Wells, in the North West Territories, to a 
refinery in Whitehorse, Yukon, from where subsequent distribution would 
be made. By the time the project had been completed it had expanded to 
include a series of airfields, numerous construction camps, pumping sta-
tions, supplementary pipelines and additional roads.54 Its utility, as well as 
efficiency, was questioned from the beginning and it has since been labelled 
a “junk-yard of military stupidity.”55 Lieutenant-General Pope, who was a 
Canadian member of the PJBD, later commented that “the CANOL project 
as a defence measure has always seemed to me so far-fetched as to be ab-
surd.”56
 Of greater concern was the fact that the decision to proceed with the 
project was once again taken before receiving the requisite approval from the 
Canadian government. Canadian historian Donald Creighton observed that 
“the United States army authorized the pipeline and signed a contract with 
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Imperial Oil more than a fortnight before the Canadian government signi-
fied its approval.”57 Furthermore, additional airfields were built in support of 
the project without consulting the Canadian government.58 
 The American insensitivity to Canadian control prompted Vincent 
Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner in England, to comment that 
the Americans “have apparently walked in and taken possession in many 
cases as if Canada were unclaimed territory inhabited by a docile race of 
aborigines.”59 His diary entries noted further disquieting observations. “The 
Americans,” Massey recorded, “who unfortunately under cover of the needs 
of the war effort are acting in the North-West as if they owned the country 
...We have for too long been far too supine vis-à-vis Washington and the only 
threat to our independence comes from that quarter.”60 
  As the war progressed, all perceived threats to the North American 
land mass, particularly in the Arctic, diminished dramatically;61 suspicions 
of American intentions, however, did not. Malcolm MacDonald, the British 
High Commissioner in Canada, visited the northern projects and reported 
to the Canadian Cabinet War Committee that “it was quite evident that 
these vast undertakings were being planned and carried out with a view 
to the post war situation. Canadian representatives in the area were few 
and quite unable to keep control or even in touch with day to day develop-
ments.”62 Civilian entrepreneurs also questioned the long-term motives of 
the Americans. J.K. Cornwall, an Edmonton businessman, said “I visualize 
the U.S.A. controlling to a large extent the development of Canada’s north 
land, due to their financial power and experience.”63
 But no-one was more suspicious than the Prime Minister. “Despite his 
close friendship with Roosevelt,” disclosed the Prime Minister’s secretary, 
J.W. Pickersgill, “Mackenzie King was never without suspicions of the ul-
timate designs of the Americans ... He referred to ‘the efforts that would be 
made by the Americans to control developments in our country after the 
war.’”64 King’s own diaries offer testimony to these misgivings. “I viewed 
the Alaskan Highway,” he wrote, “and some other things growing out of 
the war, which was clear to my mind that America had had as her policy, 
a western hemisphere control which would mean hemispheric immun-
ity, if possible, from future war but increasing political control by United 
States Forces greater than those of any one country working to this end.”65 
Moreover, he confided in Vincent Massey that “he had grave doubts whether 
international agreements [on U.S. withdrawal from bases and installations 
on Canadian soil] on this which Canada had secured from the United States 
[would] provide any practical guarantee against the United States’ claims 
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and pretensions.”66 King went on to say that “Canadians were looked upon 
by Americans as a lot of Eskimos.”67
 This fear of “possible domination of post-war Canada by the Americans” 
led King to believe that it was necessary to displace the Americans from 
further development in the North and “keep control in our own hands.”68 
The prevailing perception of American encroachment into Canada’s North 
led directly to new initiatives to regain control and assert ownership. The 
Canadian government “now embarked on a vigorous programme intended 
to ‘re-Canadianize’ the Arctic.”69 Clearly, the new focus on the Arctic was not 
inspired by security concerns but rather for fear of losing jurisdiction over 
its territory. A military appreciation asserted that “it is of great importance 
that Canada should carefully safeguard her sovereignty in the Arctic at all 
points and at all times, lest the acceptance of an initial infringement of her 
sovereignty invalidate her entire claim and open the way to the intrusion of 
foreign interests of a nature which might create an ultimate threat to national 
security.”70 
 Specific action to reclaim the North began with the appointment of a 
Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in Northwest Canada. His task 
was to supervise and coordinate the activities of the government and “to 
maintain close and continuous cooperation with all agencies of the United 
States government in the area.”71 The government’s most influential initia-
tive, however, was the policy of reimbursing the Americans for the cost of 
construction and development that was undertaken in the North.72 
  The tight-fisted King government realized that retention of clear owner-
ship and title to its North required payment for those bases and facilities of a 
permanent nature that were built by the Americans. What made this decision 
more painful was the fact that most of the projects were never supported as 
necessary by the Government, and almost all were constructed to standards 
far in excess of Canadian requirements. Despite these realities, the need to 
buy back control was seen as primordial and a new financial agreement was 
reached between the two nations in June of 1944. It resulted in the acceptance 
of a further war debt of $123.5 million to reimburse the Americans for work 
that had been done.73 The principle in question was simple. King himself, 
prior to the outbreak of war, pronounced that “domestic ownership, main-
tenance and control of all military stations and personnel is one of the really 
indispensable hall marks of national sovereign self government.”74
 This fundamental belief led the government, in the interest of sover-
eignty, to buy back the North and ensure clear title of Canadian ownership. 
The Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities reported 
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in January 1945: “As time went on, it became increasingly apparent that the 
existence of major military installations in Canada built, paid for and oper-
ated by the United States might impair Canada’s freedom of action. This dif-
ficulty has been mitigated, if not eliminated, by the Canadian Government’s 
decision, agreed to by all the United States, to reimburse the United States 
for construction costs of all airfields and certain other facilities of continuing 
value erected in Canada by the United States.”75 
 The lessons learned through painful experience during the war were 
not lost. “The war,” wrote Desmond Morton, “had taught Canadians how 
swiftly the Americans could move when their minds were made up and how 
little weight Ottawa’s appeals really carried in Washington.”76 A government 
report frankly stated that “if Canada had refused or failed to undertake 
projects which formed part of United States plans or measures in Canadian 
territory for the special protection of the United States, the United States was 
willing and even anxious to proceed alone.”77 
 Clearly, the realization that American security concerns represented a 
genuine threat to Canadian sovereignty was entrenched by the end of the 
Second World War. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Canadian 
North. “We had to discharge our obligations to make sure that nobody at-
tacked the U.S. over our territory,” explained General McNaughton. “If we 
had not done so there was the danger that the U.S. might have taken over the 
Canadian North in the interest of their own security.”78 This fear led to a new 
focus on the North and the acceptance of an enormous debt for unwanted 
infrastructure. The motive was primarily to preserve control and sover-
eignty of Canadian territory and not the result of a concern for security. The 
new geo-political reality was that Canada and the United States formed a 
strategic unit. As a result, American security was of vital interest to Canada.79 
“Because of the gateway which Canada opens to an enemy,” King noted, “the 
defence of this continent is bound to be increasingly that of the United States 
itself.”80 
 This awareness, combined with the dramatic improvements in technol-
ogy and the growing antagonism between the newly emerged superpowers, 
cast Prime Minister King’s pre-war pledge in a new light. It now took on 
the likeness of a curse. Sandwiched geographically between the two rivals, 
Canadians quickly deduced the hazards and the potential penalty of at-
tempting to remain aloof. A Canadian diplomat underscored the danger by 
pointing out that “the United States military men refer, whether nervously or 
menacingly, to the ‘undefended roof of North America’ and claim the right to 
return en masse to the Canadian Northland which they left so recently.”81 If 
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the Second World War forced the nation’s political and military leadership to 
take a direct interest in the North because of a fear of losing Canadian control 
and ownership, then the post-war era burned the issue of Arctic sovereignty 
into their very soul. 
 Any respite from American encroachment in the North that the 
Canadian politicians had hoped to gain at the cessation of hostilities in 
1945 quickly disappeared. The geographical reality was also highlighted 
in a 1946 classified American military appreciation on the problems of joint 
defence in the Arctic. It concluded that “the physical facts of geographical 
juxtaposition and joint occupation of the North American continent have at 
all times carried the implication that the defence of Canada and the defence 
of the United States cannot be artificially divorced. Recent technological 
developments rendering Canada’s Arctic vulnerable to attack and thereby 
exposing both Canada and the United States to the threat of invasion and 
aerial assault across the northern most reaches of the continent have greatly 
heightened the compulsion to regard the defence of the two countries as a 
single problem.”82 
 The Canadian assessment, although similar, was blunter. Norman 
Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, wrote: “To the 
Americans the defence of the United States is continental defence, which in-
cludes us, and nothing that I can think of will ever drive that idea out of their 
heads. Should then, the United States go to war with Russia they would look 
to us to make common cause with them, and, as I judge their public opinion, 
they would brook no delay.”83 Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent quipped that 
“Canada could not stay out of a third World War if 11,999,999 of her 12,000,000 
citizens wanted to remain neutral.”84
 Once again Canada was caught in the vortex of American security con-
cerns. The North was perceived as a unprotected gateway to invasion that 
required immediate and costly measures to minimize its vulnerability.85 
Canadian politicians and their military commanders quickly supported 
the new emphasis on the defence of the North, but they did so to minimize 
American encroachment in the Arctic. The motive behind Canadian defence 
policy in the North remained one of countering perceived American pene-
tration in the interest of sovereignty – not security.
 Although an element of menace was recognized, Canadians consistently 
questioned their ally’s assessments of risk. This difference in the threat per-
ception is an important indicator that reinforces the true motive behind the 
government’s focus in the North. By 1946, joint military planning committees 
warned of a serious threat, within a few years, to the security of Canada and 
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the United States by means of attacks on North America by manned bombers 
equipped with atomic weapons.86 The updated Canada-U.S. Basic Security 
Plan (revised ABC-22) more accurately reported that “up to 1950, the Soviets 
could use subversion and sabotage by internal groups; covert biological and 
chemical attacks; air attacks against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland and the 
use of airborne irregular forces ranging throughout the continent.”87 By 1952, 
military planners projected “the use of the atomic bomb delivered by long 
range aircraft and the occupation of Newfoundland, Alaska and Greenland 
for the forward basing of Soviet bomber aircraft and airborne forces.”88 The 
Americans therefore maintained a worrisome interest in the Canadian 
Arctic. 
 It was this American interest in the North, more than the threat posed 
by possible invasion, that concerned Canadian politicians. Their view of the 
risk of Soviet invasion was somewhat different. Scholars have pointed out 
that Canadian defence analysts were “less alarmist” than their American 
counterparts about Soviet intentions and the pace of technological advan-
cements.89 A Canadian intelligence report assessed that “the USSR is not 
considered capable at the present time of endangering, by direct action, the 
security of Canada and the United States.”90 It bluntly stated that the present 
American outlook gave an impression of a greater threat to the security of 
Canada and the United States than actually existed. It specifically disagreed 
with the American claim of increased enemy capability that ascribed to the 
Soviets the potential to seize objectives in Alaska, Canada, or Labrador, from 
which they could strike strategic targets in North America. The report com-
mented that the Americans “credit a potential enemy with greater capabil-
ities than we consider reasonable.”91 The British Foreign Office concurred. 
They affirmed that “Russia, so far as we can judge, is neither prepared for nor 
in the mood for war, and Stalin is a sober realist.”92 
 Canadian diplomats supported this viewpoint. Norman Robertson ac-
knowledged “the scales of attack, to which it could reasonably be held we 
were exposed, were, are, and will be, almost insignificant.”93 The nation’s 
military commanders agreed. “I feel,” conceded the Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff, “[that] there is often a tendency for the Americans to place the 
worst picture before us in our discussions, with the result that our thinking 
is often along the lines of 100% protection and does not take into account a 
more realistic policy of calculated risk.”94 
 Significantly, Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence, shared 
the same belief. He felt strongly that Canada faced no imminent threat. “On 
the information as is available to the Canadian government,” he wrote, “it 
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appears most unlikely that the Soviet Union would be in a position to wage 
another war in the near future, and for this reason it is highly improbable 
that the Soviet Government would run the risk of deliberately provoking 
such a war.”95 Claxton postulated that the Soviet Union required a period of 
15 years before it would be physically capable of war.96
 The scepticism of the actual risk was not a function of blind ignorance. 
The politicians maintained a belief that there was no peril to Canada even at 
a time when the bogey of communism reached its zenith in the early 1950s. 
They recognized an international threat but not one to Canada itself. Gordon 
Graydon, the Parliamentary Advisor to the Canadian delegation to the 
United Nations, speaking on Soviet intentions warned of the “undisguised 
steps towards [Soviet] world domination.”97 Prime Minister St. Laurent and 
Lester Pearson both went on record as stating “the international situation 
was never more serious.”98 Other Parliamentarians were representative of 
the prevailing climate, viewing communism as “a diabolical dynamic thing 
... aiming at the destruction of all the freedoms and the inherent hard-won 
rights of man” and describing it as “the darkest and direst shadow that has 
ever fallen upon this earth.”99 
 The international threat was such that Canada expanded its armed forces 
and dramatically increased its defence expenditures. But this was done to 
facilitate the dispatch of an expeditionary force to fight the evils of commun-
ism in Korea, as well as to raise a special brigade for service in Europe.100 
Despite these concrete actions to combat the growing international menace, 
the actual danger to the Canadian Arctic was seen as minimal. “The danger 
of direct attack upon Canadian territory,” declared Claxton, “was extremely 
remote ... any attack on North America would be diversionary, designed to 
panic the people of this continent into putting a disproportionate amount of 
effort into passive local defence.”101 
 This confidence was based on an assessment of practicality, probability 
and risk. Claxton explained the factors that were important in determining 
Canada’s defensive posture. He insisted that consideration must be given to 
“the geographical position of Canada; the capacity of any possible aggressor 
to make an attack; the disposition of friendly nations; and what may be called 
the international climate.”102 Based on these criteria, the northern threat was 
quickly discounted. The government asserted: “We have to discard from any 
realistic thinking any possibility of an attack by ground forces on the area 
of Canada either by air or by sea. Anyone who has any knowledge of the 
terrain of the outlying parts of this country will realize that such an attempt 
would be worthless and useless and is not likely to be part of any aggressive 
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plans which may be launched against Canada.”103 Furthermore, the govern-
ment emphasized that invading the North “would in no way destroy our 
war-making potential nor would it have any decisive effect on winning a war 
on this continent by invasion ... you have only to look at this vast continent to 
see how formidable such a task is.”104 R.J. Sutherland likened Canada’s Arctic 
region to a strategic desert separating the two bastions of polar defence, 
Alaska and Northern Greenland. He concluded that there was no particular 
strategic value in the Canadian Arctic itself.105
 The military assessment was similar. Army appreciations considered 
the likelihood of enemy airborne attacks as extremely slight because of the 
difficulties of re-supply and re-embarkation of the attacking force.106 The 
official assessment regarding the direct defence of Canada, contained in 
Defence Scheme No. 3, concluded that as a result of the extremely limited 
base facilities in Eastern Siberia, the Soviets were not capable of more than 
isolated airborne operations, none totalling more than a few hundred men. 
Furthermore, it explained that the lack of fighter escort would make sustained 
operations impossible. More importantly, the official defence plan identified 
only Western Alaska and the Aleutian Islands as targets of potential enemy 
airborne forces.107 Joint Intelligence Committee assessments clearly remarked 
that the data available “implies that the Soviet Union cannot land any air-
borne forces on Canadian territory.”108
 The marginalization of the North as a potential ‘gateway to invasion’ 
was further advanced by the Cabinet Defence Committee. It rationalized 
that “if the Soviets attempted to use a Canadian Arctic station as a bomber 
base, warning would be received and it was expected that such a base, which 
would have immense supply problems, could be immobilized rapidly.”109
 The double-edged nature of establishing facilities in the North was now 
exploited. Prime Minister King carefully weighed the Governor General’s ob-
servation that bases in the Arctic “may become bases from which the enemy 
himself may operate were they not there.”110 He subsequently formulated the 
strategy that “our best defence in the Arctic is the Arctic itself.”111 Claxton re-
iterated the belief when he stated: “In working out the doctrine of defence of 
our north, the fewer airfields we have the fewer airfields we have to defend 
against the possibility of the enemy using them as stepping stones from which 
to leapfrog toward our settled areas. Indeed, were it possible the greatest single 
defence throughout our northland would be the rough nature of the ground 
and the extent of the territory itself.”112 General McNaughton agreed with 
the concept that “ice is something of a defence in itself,” and Lester Pearson 
quickly dubbed the government’s position the “scorched ice policy.”113 
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  In spite of the government’s position on the actual threat to its North, or 
lack thereof, it still continued to funnel resources into the Arctic. During the 
period 1945-1956, it increased the number of weather stations in the Arctic; 
increased arctic research and developed a permanent research facility in 
Fort Churchill; escalated the number of northern exercises; based the army 
permanent force establishment on an air portable / air transportable brigade 
(Mobile Strike Force) with a specific task of countering enemy lodgements in 
the North; formed the Canadian Rangers to increase northern patrols; and 
cooperated in the construction, financing and manning of a series of early 
warning radar networks.114 
 These actions were not based primarily on security concerns, but were 
rather part of the government’s active “re-Canadianization” program which 
was aimed at “keeping the Canadian Arctic Canadian.”115 Government re-
ports highlighted the necessity of ensuring effective protection of Canadian 
sovereignty because of the fear of American penetration. One note from the 
Privy Council Office remarked that “our experiences since 1943 have indi-
cated the extreme care which we must exercise to preserve Canadian sover-
eignty in remote areas where Canadians are outnumbered and outranked .… 
Of much greater concern is the sort of de facto U.S. sovereignty which caused 
so much trouble in the last war and which might be exercised again.”116
 Canadian concern for the North was aptly described by an editorial 
in The Canadian Forum. “We must be certain,” it wrote, “that we defend it 
[Canada] as much from our ‘friends’ as from our ‘enemies.’”117 Action was 
taken, despite the absence of a legitimate concern for security, because “what 
we have to fear,” explained Norman Robertson, “is more a lack of confidence 
in United States as to our security, rather than enemy action .… If we do 
enough to assure the United States we shall have done a good deal more than 
a cold assessment of the risk would indicate to be necessary.”118 This was the 
reason for the continuing Canadian focus on its Arctic region. 
 The immediate post-war concern for the perceived northern Achilles 
heel eventually began to wane and by the mid 1950s the menace from the 
Arctic was seen almost exclusively as an air threat. Political and military 
leaders generally agreed that “the only probable method of attack is by 
air,”119 and “that in the final analysis the task of Canadian defence is defence 
against aerial attack over the north pole.”120 The new assessment provided 
Canadian politicians with a welcome respite. The emphasis of military activ-
ity in the North shifted from a focus on active “defence” to one of simply 
“surveillance.” Department of National Defence annual reports documented 
the subtle switch. The stated threat no longer postulated potential surprise 
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attacks in coordination with a campaign of aerial bombardment of North 
America. The yearly summaries now narrowly defined the danger as an air 
threat based on the manned bomber.121 
 The air threat itself evolved, due to technological advancements, and 
the manned bomber was seen as being largely replaced by the intercontin-
ental ballistic missile (ICBM). By 1963, Paul Hellyer, the MND, believed 
“the air threat to North America consists of long range ICBMs, submarine 
or ship launched intermediate range ballistic missiles and manned bomb-
ers.”122 The new ICBM threat relegated the Arctic’s importance simply to 
one of strategic depth. General Charles Foulkes explained this new reality 
meant that “we will have to rely on the deterrent and retaliatory effect of 
the U.S. strategic [nuclear] force. So that with the passing of the bomber, 
the Canadian contribution to the defence of North America will be greatly 
diminished and the importance of Canadian air space and territory … will 
be seriously reduced.”123 
 As prophesied, the American interest in the Canadian North declined 
dramatically during this period. Not surprisingly, as the threat of American 
encroachment in the Arctic disappeared, so did the Canadian interest. The 
navy gradually stopped its northern cruises in the summer. Surveillance 
flights were pared down. Army exercises ceased. Furthermore, the radio 
system, as well as the Alaska Highway, was turned over to civil depart-
ments of the government. Finally, the Canadian Rangers were allowed to 
languish.124 
 The lack of concern was further evidenced in the 1964 White Paper. It 
did not include a single reference to the Arctic. This is not surprising and 
would seem logical in accordance with strategist Colin Gray’s observation 
that “since the mid-1960s there has been no military incentive to urge the 
Canadian Forces to be active in the North. Reference to ‘foreign incursions,’ 
let alone ‘lodgements,’ should be treated with the contempt they merit.”125 But 
Gray missed the point. “Military incentive” was never the motive.
 Another perceived American challenge underlined this. In 1969, the 
Americans announced that the supertanker Manhattan, belonging to the 
Humble Oil Company, intended to conduct a voyage through the Northwest 
Passage as part of an experiment to study the feasibility of transporting 
Alaskan crude oil through the northern waters year-round. The Americans 
did not seek Canadian permission. They considered the Northwest Passage 
international waters. The Canadians, however, fervently asserted that the 
Passage was strictly territorial waters. As a result, the Manhattan incident 
sparked another frenzy of politically directed military activity in the North. 
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Maxwell Cohen captured the essence of the challenge. “Manhattan’s two 
voyages,” he wrote, “made Canadians feel that they were on the edge of an-
other American steal of Canadian resources and rights which had to be dealt 
with at once by firm governmental action.”126
Map 1. From P.W. Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish, “The Cold War on Canadian Soil: 
Militarizing a Northern Environment,” Environmental History 12/3 (October 2007).
 This action included increased activity in the North. The military was 
once again given the principal role of protecting Canadian authority in the 
Arctic. “Our first priority in our defence policy,” asserted Prime Minister 
Trudeau, “is the protection of Canadian sovereignty.”127 This affirmation was 
later followed by the External Affairs Minister’s admission that the future 
role of Canadian forces would be “in the surveillance of our own territory 
and coastlines in the interests of protecting our sovereignty.”128 
 Changes were rapidly implemented. Year-round training of soldiers 
in the North was re-introduced in March 1970. The following month a new 
permanent northern headquarters, to coordinate military activities in the 
North, was established in Yellowknife.129 Furthermore, a new defence White 
Paper, tabled in 1971, emphasized sovereignty protection as the prime com-
mitment of the Canadian Armed Forces.130 The government cleverly used the 
requirement to bolster its ability to defend its territory and sovereignty in the 
North to help explain the withdrawal of half of its forces from NATO Europe.
 Critics viewed the “whole emphasis on the North” as a sham and one 
editorialist wrote that “while Pierre Trudeau didn’t invent the Arctic, he 
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certainly seems determined to re-discover and exploit it for political pur-
poses.”131 The crux of the accusation was appropriate. The White Paper em-
phasized the perennial distress over American encroachment instead of any 
concern over security. Military threat was never a serious issue. The NDHQ 
Directorate of Strategic Planning insisted that “apart from the threat of aero-
space attack on North America, which can be discounted as an act of rational 
policy, Canada’s geographic isolation effectively defends her against attack 
with conventional land or maritime forces.”132 Predictably, once the storm 
over the Manhattan incident died away, and the cuts to the Canadian Forces 
in Europe had been implemented, the emphasis on Arctic sovereignty was 
allowed to dissipate. 
 Concern for the Arctic ebbed with the tide and generated little interest 
until the Americans triggered hypersensitive nationalist sentiments once 
again in 1985. The announcement, with no accompanying request, of the 
impending voyage through the Northwest Passage of the U.S. Coast Guard 
cutter Polar Sea incited a shrill cry for protection of Canadian sovereignty.133 
The military was once again mobilized to meet the non-military threat to 
its North. The Canadian Strategic Review 1985-1986 noted that the govern-
ment’s decision “to underscore Canadian sovereignty in the north with an 
increased air and naval presence was reminiscent of the steps taken by the 
Trudeau government during the late 1960s and early 1970s.”134 Melvin Conant 
linked the Polar Sea moving through Canadian waters to the “political recep-
tivity of an increased defense effort.”135 
 The magnified emphasis on defence was subsequently highlighted in 
the 1987 White Paper, Challenge and Commitment. Like its predecessor, the 
White Paper established as “its first priority the protection and furtherance 
of Canada’s sovereignty as a nation.”136 It stated: “After the defence of the 
country itself, there is no issue more important to any nation than the protec-
tion of its sovereignty. The ability to exercise effective national sovereignty is 
the very essence of nationhood.”137 
 The government initiatives included the North American Air Defence 
Modernization Program,138 a proposed new Northern (Army) Training 
Centre, the designation of five northern airfields as Forward Operating 
Locations, the construction of the Polar 8 icebreaker, and a new fleet of nucle-
ar submarines.139 These programs were rooted in a response to a perceived 
challenge to sovereignty and not as a result of a concern for security. The 
White Paper commented that technology had nullified the Arctic Ocean as 
an historic buffer between the superpowers and had made the Arctic more 
accessible. “Canadians cannot ignore,” it stated, “that what was once a buffer 
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could become a battleground.”140 But the underlying motive was explained 
by Perrin Beatty, the Minister of National Defence. “Our sovereignty in the 
Arctic,” he admitted, “cannot be complete if we remain dependent on allies 
for knowledge of possible hostile activities in our waters, under our ice and 
for preventing such activities.”141 This concern was used to justify the cost 
of a fleet of submarines. It was not in response to the belief in a potential 
Arctic battleground. This point of view is shared by Canadian military strat-
egists who “have privately mused that ... it seems safe to assume the threat 
of attack on or through the ice of the Arctic Ocean against Canada is indeed 
negligible.”142 Joseph Jockel asserted that “it is important not to overrate the 
importance of Canadian Arctic waters .... To the north, there are very sub-
stantial limitations to the firing positions SLCM-carrying submarines could 
take up.”143 Jockel underscored the true stimulus behind the government 
programs when he remarked that “the Canadian emphasis on sovereignty 
protection places a premium on the presence of Canadians, rather than on 
the fulfilment of a defence mission.”144 
 Fiscal realities and the end of the Cold War quickly dampened the latest 
surge of interest in the Arctic. Many of the programs proposed, such as the 
fleet of nuclear submarines, the northern training centre and the Polar 8 
icebreaker, were never implemented. However, the emphasis on sovereignty 
did not wane. The 1994 Defence White Paper echoed the sentiments of its pre-
decessors and emphasized sovereignty as a vital attribute of a nation-state.145 
This was reinforced in DND’s Defence Planning Guidance documents which 
reiterated that although Canada faces no direct military threat, it must have 
the ability to protect its sovereignty.146
 The Arctic was never seen as a gateway to invasion. Prior to the Second 
World War there was little focus on the North. With the exception of a few 
far-sighted individuals who envisioned the importance of a transpolar air 
route to Asia and Europe, as well as the national value of a network of north-
ern airfields and communications sites, most considered the Arctic nothing 
more than a frozen wasteland. The question of the North being a security 
risk was never considered.
 The war changed the Canadian apathy toward its Arctic region. The 
spectre of a Japanese or Nazi-occupied Siberia, from which attacks could 
be launched against North America, stimulated a new American focus on 
Alaska. The American mobilization to protect its northern-most frontier 
spilled into Canada and shocked Canadian politicians. American energy 
and resources quickly transformed the Canadian North into a hive of activ-
ity. Unfortunately, the Americans placed little weight on the formalities of 
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ownership and executed their tasks with a single-mindedness that raised the 
concern that the long neglected North was under de facto United States con-
trol. For Prime Minister King the apparent loss of autonomy and independ-
ence was intolerable and action was quickly taken to “re-Canadianize the 
Canadian Arctic.”
 Canadians quickly realized that when it came to the defence of North 
America, the technological advancements of aircraft and weapon systems, 
as well as the reality of geography, made Canada and the United States a 
single strategic unit. Furthermore, it was evident that any American concern 
for security became a real danger for Canada. It was well understood that if 
Canada failed to take the appropriate action to ensure its frontiers were safe 
from any hostile action that could endanger the United States, the Americans 
would do so unilaterally. As a result, in an effort to maintain control and 
sovereignty over the North, the Canadian government undertook an ener-
getic and costly program to halt American penetration. The motive was 
strictly one of sovereignty. Security was never the over-riding issue.
 The theme of sovereignty over security, as the catalyst of government 
concern for the Canadian Arctic, was replayed consistently during the post-
war era. A decline in activity and interest in the North by the Americans 
was always paralleled by a reduction in the Canadian effort. However, the 
Canadian focus was always quickly energized by the appearance of any 
American challenges, such as the voyages of the Manhattan in 1969 and the 
Polar Sea in 1985. In both cases, shrill cries lamenting the loss of sovereignty 
in the North triggered visceral public debate. Equally, in both cases the gov-
ernment quickly reverted to its default setting and responded by increasing 
military activity in the North. The use of the military was a symbolic and 
very effective tool to reinforce its sovereignty. But the Canadian Forces were 
used to provide a presence, as an exhibition of control and ownership of the 
North, rather than to perform any real military mission. 
 The North was never seen by Canadian authorities as a gateway to inva-
sion. Instead, Canada’s location was often viewed as a curse. Canada was 
sandwiched between two rival superpowers and as the weaker ally of a more 
powerful, and at times paranoid, neighbour, it had little option but to ensure 
it took the necessary action to placate the security concerns of the United 
States, regardless of its own best interests. In the process Canadians became 
more concerned with defending their North from their close ally than they 
were from any perceived threat of invasion. To the Canadian government it 
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